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Introduction
In the first section of this review essay, I present my sequential but
crisscross-referential reading of Ives’ book setting aside a critical
lens. In the second section, I report a dialogic exchange I had with
Peter Ives. This exchange, which took place via several emails, could qualify as
a real dialogue because Ives was not only willing to clarify some of the points I
considered to be problematic in his book, but also willing to share with me other,
less obvious issues that would have been relevant for his overall analysis.
Four main chapters constitute the body of this book. At the book’s centre,
Ives suggests that the study of Gramsci’s politics of language could allow us to
question, for example, the signification of English as a global language in our
contemporary world. Throughout this book, Ives attempts to make the point that
Gramsci’s work continuously brings back language as a social issue and that we
could use the same application to understand the impact of linguistic realities on
national constituent collectivities, which can articulate and mobilize language as
social weapons. This reminds me of the political use of language in Québec,
where the topic of language is always related to that of self-determination.
Nontheless, Ives’ book makes the case that language is a central topic in
Gramsci’s writings. He restates Gramsci’s claims that language is formed histor-
ically, comparing language with the economy and the state, which are human
communication, rather than a political site of struggle in which ideology and
hegemonic practices are deployed.
Reading Gramsci’s Politics of Language
The title of this book sets its central argument, as well as Ives’ position, vis-à-vis
Gramsci’s work. Indeed, the book is really about the politics of language and not
an exploration of the complexity of Gramsci’s political engagement per se. The
route leading to Gramsci’s linguistic politics, however, cannot be dissociated
totally from his political engagement. This direction is indeed made up of multi-
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ple interventions by actors—mostly theorists of language Gramsci met during his
life—that shaped the interjunction between his understanding of language as a
political weapon and his subsequent overall political engagement. 
In the first chapter, Ives introduces us to the foundation of Gramsci’s
approach to language. He uses the work of Lo Piparo as a basis to demonstrate
“how Gramsci’s linguistic theory can elucidate his political theory and to provide
the basis for a Marxist theory of language” (p. 17). In addition, Ives shows “how
Gramsci’s linguistics should be seen as part of his more general reaction against
positivism and mechanistic social theory on one hand, and Crocean idealism on
the other” (p. 19), and he argues that “since, for Gramsci, language is based on a
metaphor, the philosophy of praxis can use linguistic terms and models metaphor-
ically in other realms of social inquiry and action” (p. 19).
Throughout this analysis, we learn that Gramsci considered the lack of a uni-
tary, national language in Italy to be problematic. In other words, Gramsci
believed that a unifying language is necessary for the nation of Italy because “the
non-existence of a national language creates friction among the popular masses”
(p. 47). This friction is brought on by hegemony; Gramsci characterized it as “the
relationship between spontaneous grammar and the prevailing normative gram-
mar” (p. 50). Later on in the book, Ives makes some clear distinctions between
Gramsci and the Bakhtin Circle, first drawing on Gramsci’s dedication “to the
possibility of a unified national-popular force and language that has not yet
existed in history and that could oppose bourgeois and fascist hegemonies that
rely on the fragmentation wrought by capitalism” (p. 73). 
This is somewhat paradoxical, because other works focusing on Gramsci
seem to paint an individual fully against any sort of national common sense, espe-
cially when there is a risk of hegemonic domination. For example, in discussing
Gramsci’s and Marx’s views of faith, Ives shows that Gramsci does not reject the
importance of faith but is concerned with the Roman Catholic Church as an insti-
tution that creates world views. For Gramsci, Ives notes, “rational arguments do
not exist in a vacuum” (p. 121) and are not (or should not be) sufficient to change
one’s opinion, “convictions, criteria of discrimination and standard of conduct”;
he calls those shifting minds irrational and schizophrenic, because “faith is an
integral component of any progressive hegemony” (p. 121). At another level,
Gramsci would criticize Croce’s, Adorno’s, and Horkheimer’s approaches to
“thought in general,” “which for them means bourgeois thought developed by
Enlightenment philosophers” ( p. 161), for leaving out vernacular thought and
thus “obliterating historically grounded places from which to challenge the
dynamics of bourgeois reason” ( p. 161). In other words, through the reading of
this book, we have a very selective picture of Gramsci, ideologically speaking,
because he is always positioning himself against both the religious ideology and
certain central articulations of the Enlightenment philosophers, as well as preach-
ing for national unity, a concept subjected to both religion and Enlightenment. 
Ives shows the presence of a strong nationalistic feeling in Gramsci’s work,
especially when it comes to language; Gramsci believed strongly in common
sense as a weapon to fight social classes. We need to take some steps back at the
beginning of this book to appreciate this nationalistic feeling in Gramsci’s work.
320 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 33 (2)
Indeed, Ives’ book begins by locating “the tenets of a historical materialist
approach to language and a linguistically concerned theory of politics and soci-
ety” in Gramsci’s writings (p. 3). Ives uses a vernacular approach, or vernacular
materialism, to explain the hegemonic conflict between high and low classes. In
this context, the vernacular is related to the vulgar or “the common or everyday
language of a region or country” (p. 4). This understanding of the vernacular
allows Ives to “emphasize Gramsci’s attention to the historical shift in Europe”
(p. 8) from Latin to vernacular; to draw on religious overtones as well as to iden-
tify tension between vernacular models and linguistic models and, finally, to
demonstrate how “language consists of more than formal elements” (p. 9) under
which, nonetheless, complex philologic and linguistic operations take place
(p. 10). For example, Gramsci’s political understanding of “coercion” and “con-
sent” is tied to his views of language. For him, “consent does not mean individ-
ually based agreements, as portrayed by naïve and much simplified liberalism.
On the contrary, consent like coercion” is a human construction, “and the
processes of its production cannot be characterized by any absence of coercion
and consent” (p. 11). He contends that one cannot be found free of the other and
that “our experience of both depends on meanings and practices that are produced
with languages” (p. 12). In characterizing this Gramscian view of language, Ives
argues that Gramsci rejects the idea of language as nomenclature or as a medium
of representation. He sees language as “culture and philosophy [that] is very
much a substantial part of social reality” (p. 13), because there is “no concept of
a meta-language or a universal grammar of all languages” found in Gramsci’s
work (p. 12). Ives claims that Gramsci “understands meaning as constructed by
relationships within language” and that he “views language as system whereby
meaning is constructed through signs” (p. 13). 
This is fully understandable because, in part at least, grammatical studies are
still today the study of classes of words and their inflections and functional rela-
tionships in language. Ives notes that Gramsci studied under Bartoli, who was
opposed to the Neogrammarians (a group of German linguists in Leipzig) before
developing Neolinguistics, a field of the study of parts of language, nonetheless
claiming to study “only a collection of words and not language itself” (p. 21).
Bartoli’s Neolinguistics opposed the idea that “phonetic laws were exceptionless.
Instead, it emphasized the importance of culture to changes in language” (p. 21). 
Another key player in this intellectual genealogy is Croce, who became
opposed to Bartoli. Croce “argues that there is no division between language and
the aesthetic and that the science of art and the science of language are not two
distinct things but one single science” (p. 22). Here, we can see Gramsci’s inter-
est in the practices of expression emerging, or in the impact that individual speech
acts can have on language.
Ives places Gramsci at “the nexus between Crocean idealist linguistics and
positivist linguistics as represented by the Neogrammarians” (p. 22) because
Gramsci attempted to “dialectically overcome the opposite trends of positivism
and idealism [by developing] the concepts of ‘normative’ grammar and ‘sponta-
neous’ or ‘immanent’ grammar.”  In doing so, he was able “to appropriate the
advantages of understanding the structural and institutional aspects of language
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provided by the positivism [side] of the Neogrammarians” (p. 23)1. Therefore,
Ives notes, “Gramsci’s overcoming of the errors of both the idealist and positivist
approaches to language yields a theory of language as a historical institution that
changes continuously” (p. 23). We learn that the relationship between Gramsci
and Ascoli’s theory was somehow ambivalent because Gramsci did not embrace
Ascoli’s biological theory; Ives agrues that “language is rooted in the materiality
of the production of the words” (p. 34), “because language is always historically
metaphorical [while] words and linguistic structures are always related to mean-
ings from their past” (p. 35). 
At this point, the link between language and power emerges, as well as per-
haps, as I suggested above, following Gramsci’s interest in using the grammati-
cal relationship between classes of words in language to develop his philosophy
of social classes. Indeed, Ives shows that Gramsci uses normative grammar not
only to criticize Croce’s notion of language, which he views as an “expressive act
requiring an entirely different, philosophic, method of analysis than what here he
calls ‘grammar’” (p. 37), but also to suggest that such an application of language
cannot represent normative grammar because this “is constituted by reciprocal
control, by reciprocal teaching, and by reciprocal “censorship” (p. 43), whereas
spontaneous grammar is “created throughout the molecular processes of learning
a language from birth throughout one’s entire life,” a process by which “sedimen-
tation is affected by religion, class, gender, and geographic location” (p. 44). 
The second chapter of Ives’ book tackles the notion of unity and looks at the
relationship within unified languages, moving from the work of Benjamin,
Bakhtin, and Volosinov to draw on Gramsci’s overall writings on a unified
national language. Indeed, it becomes understandable at this point that Gramsci’s
desire for a national revolution underscores his focus on the concepts of unity.
Here as well, Ives compares the beginnings of the Bakhtin Circle, which
“emerged from a fundamentally neo-Kantian setting” and Gramsci’s interest in
language, shaped by “Croce’s Hegelianism” (p. 59). Ives points out that
“Volosinov’s important insight is that Croce, Vossler, and Humboldt all see lan-
guage as the movement from something expressible that initiates in the inner
depth of the psyche and is expressed on the outer surface of perceptible sound
that is language” (p. 70). Here we can see that one of the basic conceptions of lan-
guage shared by both Volosinov and Gramsci is the connection between language
and ideology. In addition, Gramsci’s concept of grammar and the historical con-
nection between language, ideology, and “meaning incorporates structuralist and
post-structuralist views of language as a system of signs” (p. 72).
Ives then moves on to show that Gramsci is a “political theorist and activist”
and that Bakhtin is a “literary critic and philosopher” (p. 73). Finally, he claims
that “Gramsci’s advocacy of a national unified language is guided by political
issues that are beyond Bakhtin’s explicit purview” (p. 73). Ives emphasizes
Bakhtin’s notion of “dialogue,” claiming that “Bakhtin relies heavily on dialogue
as a metaphor for ethical behaviour, as an epistemological premise, and ulti-
mately as human ontology” (p. 74). But as he rightly asks, “[D]ialogue is inher-
ently linguistic, but is language inherently dialogical? What does it mean to say
that language is inherently dialogic?”  These two questions lead Ives to introduce
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the notion of heteroglossia, defined as “the principle that meaning is” contextu-
ally bounded “but that context is boundless” (p. 75). Its opposite, monoglossia, as
defined by Bakhtin, “is the resistance of language’s ‘natural’ and ‘inherent’ dia-
logic essence” (p. 76). Bakhtin argues that “social diversity and heteroglossia are
manifested in languages but are not inherently a part of language” (p. 78).
This claim regarding heteroglossia has two implications: “First, without
divorcing language from everyday life, it makes the issue of whether language is
heteroglotic irrelevant by focusing on the strong connections between languages
and social activity. Second, it avoids the reduction that heteroglossia is necessar-
ily good and democratic whereas monoglossia is inherently bad and antidemoc-
ratic” (p. 79). Using Volosinov’s discussion of the reflection and refraction of all
ideological products, Ives notes that for Volosinov, “within every sign there is a
diversity of its own materiality that also reflect[s] and refract[s] other realities”
(p. 80). Ives links this idea with Gramsci’s understanding of class struggles
because, he argues, the multiple accents of signs are always “resisted by the rul-
ing class, which strives to impact a supraclass, eternal character to the ideologi-
cal sign, to extinguish or drive inward the struggle between social value
judgements which occur in it, to make the sign uniaccentual” (p. 81).
Gramsci and Bakhtin have many similar views and interests, first regarding
the shift from Latin to vernacular languages—they both agree that it is “intri-
cately linked to larger ideological and social changes” (p. 90)—and second on the
traditional definition of translation. On the first point, Gramsci believes that “the
medieval ages were marked by the crystallization of literary Latin into ‘middle-
Latin’, a language used by scholars and intellectuals in everyday life” (p. 90). For
Ives, the common ground for Gramsci and Bakhtin is that the “unity does not
mean homogeneity, monoglossia, or uniaccentuality. Rather it includes unique-
ness and differences that are not ‘transcended,’ ‘overcome,’ or merged” (p. 93).
According to Ives,
the most significant difference between Gramsci and Bakhtin is that
Gramsci believes in the possibility of an actual, ‘prosaic,’ progressive uni-
fied language in which differences are held intact and not obliterated, in
which voices exist. For Bakhtin, this type of unity and organization is cer-
tainly found in the field of literature with the unity of the novel. But it is
an open question whether Bakhtin thinks we should place our faith in con-
structing such an open unity in a nation or community of people. (p. 95)
The third chapter of Ives’ book focuses on the relationships among different
languages and thoroughly compares the notion of translation developed by
Gramsci and by one particular Frankfurt Schüler: Benjamin. Although it focuses
on Benjamin, this chapter does not deal with the Frankfurt School linguistic the-
ory, but rather opens up to it because, as Ives notes, language is “the highest level
of mimetic behaviour and the most complete archive of nonsensuous similarity”
for Benjamin (p. 125). But this appropriation of language does not allow Benjamin
to overcome “the subject/object dichotomy at the heart of bourgeois philosophy in
a manner that provides a critique or a way forward,” as his work “consistently pre-
sumes that the subject, the word, is separate from the object, the world” (p. 127). 
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It is at this point of contention that we can locate the political split between
the Marxist side of Benjamin’s view of language—and perhaps the common
cited-heritage of Benjamin’s work in the playing field of Frankfurt School dis-
courses—and Gramsci’s view on the subject/object relationship. As noted in the
earlier stages of this review, one of the main paradoxes, and conceivably the most
interesting one is to find in Gramsci very strong agency. For example, at the same
time as he expresses his faith in nationalism and a search for unity, he also
opposes the other kind of unitarianism he considered being hegemony, e.g., reli-
gion and bourgeoisie. Indeed, for Gramsci, “the dichotomization of science and
reason from faith, religion and belief is spurious, and reinforces common sense
world views of bourgeois hegemony” (p. 127). He then argues that “both the ide-
ology of science and most religions are based on the same unexamined presump-
tion that there is a dichotomy between humans and nature. This dichotomy is the
same as the separation between subjects and objects of the world” (p. 129). For
Gramsci, the division between subject and object is due to “bourgeois modernity,
a symptom growing stronger and stronger as new strata of traditional intellectu-
als attempt to secularize religious world views,” and for Gramsci, unlike
Benjamin, “neither a proletarian revolution nor a radical epistemological break
can erase the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity” (p. 133).
Based on this reading, the difference between Gramsci and the Frankfurt
School’s scholarship seems to be located within subject/object relationships, as
we will also see in my review of the last chapter of this book, especially when
Ives brings up some Frankfurt School positions on the dominant, hegemonic sub-
ject, constructing false consciousness with objective reality. This difference lies
within the traditional definition of the notions of science, objectivity, and predic-
tion. For Gramsci, objective means “this and only this: that one asserts to be
objective, to be objective reality, that reality which is ascertained by all, which is
independent of any merely particular group standpoint” (p. 131). He then defines
science as “the collection of methods for distinguishing that which is transitory. . .
from that which is true only for certain portions of society from that which is
‘essential’ ” (p. 131). Much like language, Gramsci believes that science is “con-
ceived historically, and it constantly affects how we perceive the world, all the
while correcting and reinforcing our sensory organs” (p. 132). 
But Ives’ book articulates many similarities between Benjamin and Gramsci.
At the centre of the third chapter, Ives insists that for Gramsci, translation is not
only a political act, but also a philosophical concept. Translation consists of “two
fundamentally similar structures [which] have “equivalent” superstructures that
are mutually translatable, whatever the particular national language” (p. 106).
This definition makes some events, concepts, and thoughts translatable and oth-
ers not. For example, for Gramsci, a qualified translator “should be able not only
to translate literally but also to translate conceptual terms of a specific national
culture into the terms of another national culture, that is, such a translator should
have critical knowledge of two civilizations and be able to acquaint one with the
other” (p. 108), which bring into play the concepts of individual innovation as art
and social innovation as language. Ives draws a clear distinction between these
two levels of intervention and argues that this distinction reinforces Benjamin’s
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and Gramsci’s concepts of translation, especially because “unlike artistic works
or poetry, translation is directed at the target language as a whole” (p. 109).
Thus, the concept of “translation” points to one of the first converging poli-
tics between Benjamin and Gramsci because both of them reject the traditional
definition of translation. In this chapter, Ives seeks to illustrate how translation
and translatability are seen through Gramsci’s writings. He then suggests that
“translation enables [Gramsci] to explain how the presentation of our experi-
ence—that of revolution—requires translation and not the mere transmission
from one context to another” (p. 101). Gramsci explored the notion of translation
to find a way to “translate” the Russian Revolution and make an Italian revolu-
tion possible. The context of an event therefore has a significant role in how it
will be translated because translation cannot be a “technical activity; instead it
requires normative judgment that makes the translation a historical act” (p. 103).
For example, for Benjamin, “linguistic diversity provides the space for transla-
tion that he sees as revelation,” whereas for Gramsci, language is “non-partho-
genetic” and thus “enables translation as revolution.” In other words, through the
notion of translation, Gramsci envisions “how this non-ethnocentric, non-teleo-
logical, communal creativity is related to revolution” (p. 105). 
Ives makes the point that Gramsci’s “extensive use of ‘translation’ was partly
a response to Croce’s drastic position that translation is impossible” (p. 113).
Although Gramsci and Benjamin look at Croce in similar ways, “Benjamin argues
that idealist historicism ends up with the same problem as positivistic versions of
history: it depicts history as what he calls ‘empty time’” (p. 114), which Gramsci
never does. However, “unlike Croce’s historicism, Benjamin’s ‘history’ recognizes
the ‘flow’ or ‘stream’ within which origins and eddies are contained” (p. 116).
Another point of converging politics between Benjamin and Gramsci is that
both of them reject “idealist versions of historicism” (p. 118). Indeed, they con-
sider history to be related to time and context. Benjamin introduces “the concept
of Jetztzeit (now-time) to expand history beyond the simple positivistic limits of
the linear chronological succession of minutes, days and years of what he calls
‘empty time’” (p. 118). Croce, who makes no distinction between chronicle and
history (“other than the spirit by which they are approached”), is highly criticized
by Gramsci, who considers Benjamin’s notion of history as “a series of progres-
sive leaps” against Croce’s notion of progressive events (p. 118). 
As Ives notes, Benjamin’s philosophy of language “reinforces the split
between subject and object because his task of translation is directed at revela-
tion” (p. 122). This split between subject and object is rooted in language, more
specifically “in the difference between historical language on the one hand, and
on the other, the originary Adamic language of the Garden of Eden” (p. 123).
Benjamin’s reading of Genesis is based on his three levels of language: “language
of things, language of human knowledge, and the creative world of God”
(p. 123). He makes a distinction between divine knowledge, which belongs to
God, and knowledge of judgment, which came after the fall and is thus “knowl-
edge of the sinner” (p. 124). He claims that “with the knowledge of judgment,
subjective names become less and less related to their objects as language
becomes increasingly instrumental and concerned with evaluation of good and
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evil rather than names” (p. 124). Benjamin believes that “language is a gift from
God” and that “in man God set language” so that “man is the knower in the same
language in which God is the creator” (p. 124). Even after the fall, Benjamin
believes that “language still has a connection to the divine world” (p. 124).
In the fourth and final chapter, Ives creates clear linkages between Gramsci
and some Frankfurt Schülers in bringing up the importance of several personages
linked to that line of thought: Habermas, Horkheimer, and Adorno. The chapter
makes an implicit statement about diverging positions within the Frankfurt
School scholars. For example, Ives notes that Gramsci is in concordance with
Habermas “about the need to thoroughly overcome the subject/object problem-
atic in the philosophy of language found in Benjamin, Adorno, and Horkheimer”
(p. 162), while Habermas “contends that the original mode of language use is
directed toward two or more speakers reaching an understanding.” Ives charac-
terizes this as the main flaw in Habermas’ work, because he is incapable of “[the-
orizing] relations of power” (p. 162) and simply sees language—with Adorno and
Horkheimer—as an instrument, a “communicative action,” which is “the possi-
bility of freedom and democratically reasoned decision making” (p. 163).
Ives further suggests that Horkheimer was interested in “the potential of root-
ing reason in language for Critical Theory” (p. 158); while both Adorno and
Horkheimer’s works “describe the regressive dialectical movement of reason as
understood by traditional philosophy,” they “also illustrate how these concepts
affected society at large by playing into the dynamics of the rise of fascism and
the logic of capitalist culture industry” (p. 159). Here, we see the points of con-
tention with some views held by Gramsci, who together with Bakhtin and
Volosinov considers “language as a site of political struggle and conflict”
(p. 163). Ives’ analysis would suggest that language, as “a vehicle for subjective
pronouncement on the world is presumed to be at odds with the world on which
it lays its dictates” (p. 153). Gramsci claims language to be “an instrumentaliza-
tion resulting from human activity” (p. 154), while Horkheimer and Adorno “con-
nect this process to capitalism and [to] the dialectic of reason and domination”
(p. 154). They see it as “all pervasive, and as a transformation that is distancing
language farther and farther from its origins in mimetic reflection between words
and the reality they represent” (p. 155).
The overall strategy taken by Ives in this chapter is thus to approach these
linkages with the topics of language and reason and to illustrate not only the
points of discrepancy (that of subject/object, as I noted above), but also certain
points of convergence. For example, by arguing that Habermas’ conception of
rationality “is directly aimed at showing how the Enlightenment tradition contin-
ues to hold the promise of moving us beyond a world governed by coercive
nation-states and institutions (or steering media)” (p. 135), Ives is also grounding
Gramsci’s work in the domain of ideology. Another example of this is that the
Frankfurt School sought to better understand the rise of fascism through different
methods, one of which was an analysis of the psyche, an articulation also found
in Gramsci’s work. Indeed, Gramsci and the Frankfurt School believed that “fas-
cism developed out of nineteenth-century liberal bourgeois capitalist society”
(p. 141). While for Habermas reason “is that which legitimates democracy”
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(p. 134), “Gramsci’s notions of language and reason, in contradistinction to
Habermas’, show how the concept of bourgeois hegemony is useful and entails
capitalist economic structures as well as bourgeois cultural and political mecha-
nisms of legitimation” (p. 138). On the same level, Horkheimer and Adorno
demonstrate how “Western philosophy defines ‘nature’ as distinct from the rea-
soning subject. Nature [being] the object of knowledge; this refers to both non-
human objects and the nature of human behaviour” (p. 141). 
Therefore, it could be said that both Gramsci’s and Horkheimer’s distinction
between traditional and critical theory depends significantly on the social location
of the subject—or the theorist—because both of them “compare traditional intel-
lectuals” who often present themselves “as neutral and unconnected to any spe-
cific class or political interest” to organic individuals, who Gramsci describes as
“organiser[s] of the confidence of investors in his business” (p. 148). Gramsci saw
Machiavelli’s work The Prince as a “live work in which political ideology and
political science are fused in the dramatic form of a ‘myth’” (p. 145). According
to Ives, Gramsci defends Machiavelli, claiming that his “moral and political aim
was to educate the uneducated. To empower those disempowered by lack of
knowledge” (p. 145). This reading of Machiavelli allows Gramsci to admit “that
the basic innovation of praxis for political science is that there is no such thing as
‘human nature,’ which can only be seen as the totality of historically determined
social relations, which can, within certain limits, be ascertained with the methods
of philology and criticism” (p. 145).
For Horkheimer, however, Machiavelli’s work brings about the relationship
between the notion of myth and that of reason; “myth” as “the anthropomorphic
projection of human traits onto the non-human world” (p. 142) and reason as
“[having] its roots in self-preservation as opposed to Enlightenment claims of
universality” (p. 143). Indeed, Horkheimer would extend the Vichian concepts of
myth and nature to social analysis through his interpretation of Machiavelli, a
position that Gramsci disagrees with. We can find several other contentions
between the Enlightenment philosophers of the Frankfurt School and Gramsci’s
work. For example, one of the last topics Ives covers in his book is Gramsci’s
position with respect to the concept of mimesis, a position contrasted with that of
Habermas and Adorno. Ives notes that Habermas opposes mimesis “with the
claim that his own theory is able to ‘capture’ what instrumental reason destroys
in Adorno’s work” (p. 167). For Habermas, the nature of “mimesis can be laid
open if we give up the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness . . . in favour
of the paradigm of linguistic philosophy . . . and put the cognitive-instrumental
aspect of reason in its proper place as part of a move encompassing communica-
tive rationality” (p. 167). Ives concludes by accrediting Gramsci as a significant
contributor to British cultural studies, stating that he “accepts some fundamental
points of Adorno and Horkheimer’s dialect of Enlightenment reason, but he
rejects the idea that it is all pervasive and that modern society is totally adminis-
tered” (p. 171).
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Interview with Peter Ives
Ottawa, Ontario/London, England, November/December 2007
Boulou Ebanda de B’béri (BB): First of all, let me thank you for accept-
ing to play this game of virtual interview with me.
Peter Ives (PI): I am very pleased that you’ve invited me to “play this game.”
There are some aspects of the format that seem quite suitable for opening new
areas of dialogue. Although I’m also aware, sitting alone in front of this com-
puter, here in England, how such email interviews cut short some types of inter-
action, body-language, and sociability only possible in face-to-face meetings,
which I hope we can have sometime. For now, I thank you, the Journal, and our
readers for this opportunity.
BB: Indeed, you’re right about the face-to-face aspect missing in this
interview; nonetheless this medium allows us to exchange and perhaps
communicate, knowing its limits. 
I want to start with the notion of vernacular materialism, which I believe,
it’d be fair enough to say that this notion helps you illustrate both philo-
logical and linguistic articulations of language in Gramsci’s work.
Therefore, my first question is to ask you to elaborate a bit on this notion
of vernacular materialism which, throughout your exploration of
Gramsci’s work, seems to be like an un-named, common sense ideology
and even hegemony, partly because on the one hand, as you showed (pp.
3-13), or as you suggested later on, a vernacular tone or any sort of ver-
nacular practice is for Gramsci similar to a vulgarised, naturalised prac-
tice. 
PI: I first came up with or stumbled on the term “vernacular materialism” in the
mid-1990s while writing my doctoral dissertation at York University in the
Programme of Social & Political Thought. It hit me at first as a funny combina-
tion of terms not only because it played on notions of “vulgar materialism” but
because it seemed to capture my frustrations with what I saw at the time as futile
debates between Marxism and post-structuralism, where language played a cen-
tral role and was always pitted against either “reality” (by Marxists) or the econ-
omy in the form of economic determinism (in straw arguments made against
Marxism’s focus on economic inequalities and capitalism). This was before Will
Kymlicka started using the term “vernacular” to describe his attempt to save lib-
eralism by incorporating minority group rights into liberalism. But the potentials
are similar, in that like much social theory that focuses on language or the ver-
nacular, the material power relationships especially as framed by global capital-
ism are often ignored. I think this is very true of Kymlicka’s work, although I
greatly admire what it does contribute.
On the other hand, those focusing on so-called “material” and economic inequali-
ties often conceptualize these issues as separate from (and more real than) issues
of language and culture. “Vernacular materialism” is a concept that tries to bring
these areas together, a focus on language from the perspective of people who use
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it daily (and face discrimination and oppression through linguistic power relations)
and a focus on an analysis of society from a historical materialist perspective.
BB: In addition to this bridging capacity that you’ve just described, a ver-
nacular seems as well not to be different from hegemony, because, as you
noted for Gramsci, “hegemony can also be understood as the progressive
creation of a popular collective spirit” (p. 30) or as Bakhtin and Gramsci
both agree, seemingly having similar views, the shift from Latin to ver-
nacular languages is “intricately linked to larger ideological and social
changes” (p. 90). Could you explain what is for you the difference
between a vernacular articulation with a purely Gramscian articulation of
ideology and hegemony?
PI: Obviously, many are interested in Gramsci precisely because his critique of
“ideology” includes an analysis of institutions and practices and not just “ideas.”
But I’m pleased that you see “vernacular materialism” as a larger issue that per-
vades my book. In a certain sense it does resonate with a “history from below”
type dynamic where what we are concerned about is language as it is used and
experienced by masses of people, rather than rarefied, abstracted and codified.
But this codification and standardization of language by elites has an important
and complex impact on how language is used by us all.
Marx addressed some of these issues, especially with Engels, in The German
Ideology where they discuss how the ideas of the ruling class in every epoch are
the ruling ideas. But Gramsci takes that much further specifically looking at shifts
like that during the Reformation when the ruling ideas are changed profoundly
but there is not necessarily a political revolution. One way in which Gramsci goes
much further than Marx and Engels is that “hegemony” includes more than “rul-
ing ideas” and “ideas” that challenge them; it extends to the institutions that dis-
seminate ideas, the complexity and contradictory nature of “ideas” as they make
their way into “common sense” and conflict with the lived experiences of those
who come to accept the “ruling ideas.” Certainly, Marx did not see “ideology” as
purely negative, as totally disingenuous distortions that just need to be debunked
and shown to simply be false. But Gramsci goes further in looking at the institu-
tions and the relations among various social groups in societies that support var-
ious ideologies which come together in “hegemonic” forces.
I am not sure what you mean by “purely” Gramscian, in that I don’t think
Gramsci ever aimed at purity and I would agree. Actually, that raises a key point
about what Stuart Hall calls the “Gramscian way of thinking” in that so often con-
cepts like “hegemony” or “passive revolution” are attributed to him when he is
explicitly taking the concepts of others and transforming them. So, for example,
“passive revolution” was a term Gramsci took from the conservative historian,
Vincenzo Cuoco, who used it more like a “bloodless” revolution in a positive
sense. Gramsci turned it on its head to see it as a negative process whereby noth-
ing that is causing the structural problems in the society is actually addressed, but
changes in the way the dominant classes rule makes it seem as if previous prob-
lems have been worked out. Anne Showstack Sassoon has a great article about
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how Gramsci uses the concepts of others in ways like this (see Gramsci’s
Subversion of Language in Rethinking Marxism from 1990). 
But to try and answer your question, Gramsci is not trying to dispel the illusions
(an approach that many take, for example, Noam Chomsky, which I think makes
his work much less effective than it might otherwise be). Rather, he is trying to fig-
ure out why and how it came to be that particular ideologies garnered so much pur-
chase, and not solely through coercion, but through the organization of consent.
But hegemony includes not only why whole groups of people accept the ideas of
the small groups who hold power, but how the institutions of society foster this,
and how the various social groupings, including economic groupings but also gen-
der, ethnic and other identities, are organized. Of course, this varies tremendously
from society to society, historical period to historical period. But certainly in
Gramsci’s Italy, the language question was crucial to this, as it is today.
For example, just in May 2006 the US Senate proclaimed English as the national
language of the United States, well over 200 years after the founding of the coun-
try. The media barely mentioned it, but it clearly signals crucial political shifts
occurring in the U.S. in terms of the growing Spanish speaking population, the
limits of US “tolerance” and “pluralism” and how the governing classes are
attempting to cope with it. This attempt to use the “power” (or at least resources)
of the state to effect language usage could be a small example of the type of hege-
monic manoeuvre of which Gramsci would be critical.
BB: You may then be anticipating my next question, which is in fact what
would have been the difference had you started your analysis of Gramsci
with what has been the recognized, and perhaps the most acclaimed
nature of his work, e.g., ideology and not language? Do you believe that
the results of your analysis would have been different and if so, why and
how?
PI: I guess I have two answers: one is that it is not an either/or issue, that my work
on Gramsci has focused on his studies in linguistics does not rule out or even de-
emphasize questions of ideology. But also, my argument in terms of intellectual
history is that Gramsci, as a Sardinian university student, went through a politi-
cal transformation from favouring some sort of Sardinian nationalism whereby
the Italians were the oppressors, to realizing that the Sardinian ruling class was
complicit in the relationship, and Sardinian subaltern classes had much in com-
mon with, and should work with, both Italian peasants and the Italian urban work-
ing classes. My argument is that Gramsci found linguistics and language politics
particularly related to these political issues and thought about them in terms of
language and linguistics more thoroughly than he did with the term “ideology.” I
discuss this a little in my second book, Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, in
terms of the many and various so-called “linguistic turns” in the 20th Century. In
the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci uses the term “ideology” in a relatively restricted
and technical sense of the perspective in terms of a system of ideas. He does not
expand it as a concept as he does with most of those ideas associated with his
name such as “hegemony,” “passive revolution,” “common sense,” “intellectu-
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als,” and “subalternity.” These are the concepts that seem to be generating signif-
icant interest amongst a host of recent studies of Gramsci’s writings.
BB: From this departure from language instead of ideology, do you
believe you would have been able to break with the practices of ideology
Gramsci himself and many of his followers defined to be inescapable
frameworks as long as consent and coercion are at play; and, if so, could
you elaborate a bit on your own strategy to get rid of this framework?
PI: Well, yes and no. On one hand, I don’t think you can break free of ideology
any more than you can break free of the need for language and a degree of lin-
guistic conformism, or of organizing the world and making commitments to cer-
tain values and ideals over other ones. Sure, using more consent and less coercion
is morally superior, but Gramsci was keen to note that tacit consent can be read-
ily mobilized to legitimate oppressive government policies. Thus, Gramsci was
trying to struggle and fight to change ideology, “common sense,” and language,
not get rid of them—and I agree with how he conceptualizes that. 
On the other hand, my work on Gramsci’s understanding of language provides a
lot of support to a theme that many others have appreciated in Gramsci, what
early on was labelled his “open” Marxism and his insistence that at least in con-
texts like his Italy, to change society for the better you cannot impose an “ideol-
ogy” or a strategy on all the subaltern social groups. Effective politics cannot be
conducted by revelation of a “true” analysis or perspective that debunks or
replaces the status quo. 
The framework that Gramsci was trying to get rid of was that notion of creating
consent with a heavy presence of the threat of coercion behind it. He was also try-
ing to get rid of the organization of passive consent that relied on people blaming
their predicament on other subaltern social groups. This was typified by the
Fascists, who did garner considerable consent in Italy. 
But Gramsci was also critical of the Socialists and other Communists, for exam-
ple, for wanting the urban working classes to be the leaders of the movement, and
not engaging with the peasantry or just assuming that the peasants would follow
the northern based proletariat. Where Lenin used the term “hegemony” really to
describe an alliance between the urban workers and the rural peasants, Gramsci
insisted that this relationship would have to be more than a mere “alliance,” but
that both groups would have to see how their positions necessarily included each
other. The very way of conceptualizing the identities of peasant and worker
would have to change. This is why he quickly broadened these questions out to
being about more than economic class questions and including issues like those
of rural Catholic women and the control over the moral and sexual lives of work-
ers under new Fordist conditions. This is why he was so concerned with theatre,
popular novellas and the like. So Gramsci uses “hegemony” to describe the types
of political force that he is highly critical of, as well as what he wants to construct
by using the Italian Communist Party.
I try to capture the essential difference between the two with the metaphor of lan-
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guage. Where Gramsci was in favour of a “common” Italian language (one could
substitute “hegemony” here), he did not want that language to be one that was
imposed upon all of Italy (even with only minimal levels of coercion). Instead, he
desired a new language to be created by a more profound interaction of the myr-
iad of dialects that existed throughout the country. He knew that this would be a
long and gradual process based on greater interaction geographically and across
different communities.
BB: Tell me a bit more about the paradox I found in your illustration of
Gramsci’s nationalism. For example, in your book, Gramsci seems to be
someone looking for national constituent common sense, e.g., he would
regret the lack of a strong, unitarian national language in Italy, and your
analysis somehow indicates that he considered grammar to be a sort of
common sense weapon, helping to fight the right of entry of multiplicity
of signs into the dominant language; yet I understood from your book
that for Gramsci the notion of unity does not mean homogeneity (p. 93);
however, how is this search for unity different and perhaps conflicting
with his work on class divisions in Italy?
PI: The question of “the nation” is quite a tricky one for us as well as Gramsci.
I’ve been thinking about it a lot since I wrote the book. Writing it, I tacitly
accepted common readings of Gramsci as being embedded in his historical time
and place, to the extent that he was not particularly conscious or concerned with
his focus on the national level of politics, which he understood, along classical
Marxist lines, as then leading to an international revolution. But several Gramsci
scholars have challenged me on this, Ursula Apitsch who is a scholar of immigra-
tion as well as Adam Morton, especially his recent book, Unravelling Gramsci.
They both emphasize the extent to which Gramsci does discuss “international”
issues and does not create stark contrasts between the national and international
levels. Rather, his attention to “the nation” as a impoverished conception during
his lifetime, but as having progressive potential, comes from the role of the state,
which exercised power on a national population and territory.
Morton in particular emphasizes Gramsci’s analysis of historical formation of the
nation-state system, and Gramsci’s notion that he could not understand his Italy
without looking to its European history. He does not then assume that “Italians”
have anything that necessarily unites them at the essential level, but sees them his-
torically as being under the sovereign rule of the Italian state. To deny that or work
against it, for example to be a Sardinian nationalist, could actually strengthen the
negative aspects of state power, and for it to be a Sardinian state would matter lit-
tle. Gramsci was also critical of “cosmopolitanism” because at his time it was a
position of the elites and businessmen who had international contacts due to their
position within capitalism, which has always been “international.” Certainly,
Gramsci was explicitly critical of biological determinism and other essentialisms
that many forms of “nationalism” are based on. So his “nationalism,” I think, is a
very particular and strategic position based on the power of the nation-state. For
us, this is significantly different, although I do not agree with those globalization
theorists who proclaim the death of the nation-state. 
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BB: To continue with the same idea, you note in your book that Marx
placed a lot of importance on religious critique and that Gramsci does not
reject the importance of faith but was concerned with the Roman
Catholic Church as an institution that creates world views and thus, con-
stitutes a powerful institution. You even push the idea that for Gramsci,
“rational arguments do not exist in a vacuum” (p. 121) and are not (or
should not be) sufficient to change one’s opinion, “convictions, criteria
of discrimination and standard of conduct”; because Gramsci called
those shifting minds irrational and schizophrenic. 
As I noted in my previous question, one of the main paradoxes and per-
haps the most interesting one is the very strong agency found in the per-
sonage of Gramsci. For example, at the same time as he expresses his
strong belief of nationalism and/or search of unity, he also positions him-
self against other kinds of unitarianism he considers to be hegemonic,
e.g., religious in the example above, but I might also add his opposition
to certain positions of Enlightenment philosophers such as their view of
an invincible subject-of-power that are institutions.
Don’t you find that to be paradoxical and perhaps contradictory, because
this is the “propre” of individual agency?
PI: I guess I would start by noting that Gramsci seemed much more concerned
with what we may call collective agency, although this did not mean a devalua-
tion of individual responsibility. I think you are right that there is certainly a ten-
sion there, whether a paradox or contradiction, I’m not sure. I suppose it is a
contradiction in that capitalism in particular, but also most systems of exploita-
tion, create contradictory consciousness and this works itself out in capitalist
society through an ideology of individualism. So Gramsci’s search for unity
(which for obvious reasons I like better than the contention that he believed in
nationalism as I addressed above) was a reaction against how the ineffective lib-
eralism and democratic socialism in Italy so easily turned into and capitulated to
a strong nationalist, authoritarianism of Fascism. I think Gramsci takes individu-
als’ and groups’ acceptance of ideas, however horrendous and objectionable,
more seriously than most do. So, of course, he would hold individuals responsi-
ble and I think he was quite hard on himself for his own failure to carry through
the wave of socialism of 1919-1920 into something progressive, but it lead to the
rise of Fascism. 
One of the reasons I like Gramsci’s writings on language so much is that they
enable a complex understanding of this tension you raise between individual
agency and social institutions that make agency possible. As Noam Chomsky, fol-
lowing Wilhelm von Humboldt, emphasizes, the amazing thing about language is
that from a finite set of rules an individual can generate an infinite set of sen-
tences (that are grammatically correct). Gramsci shows much greater awareness
of the power relations within the distinctions between what is a “correct” sen-
tence and how effective it might be in a given situation. We can see this as run-
ning along a continuum with overt coercion at one end and the organization of
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consent at the other; for example, aboriginal children in residential schools in
Canada being physically punished for not speaking English to people being
ignored and denied jobs, et cetera, because they have “accents” or are “difficult
to understand.”
I think about this when people complain to me about “the immigrants,” and are
taken aback when I respond by telling them that I am an immigrant, to at least try
to make evident their racism, which they show me because of their assumptions
about the colour of my skin as well as my accent. But in such situations, it is usu-
ally very difficult for individual speakers to use their own “agency” effectively.
They must both conform to “standards” to an extent, as well as create institutions
and spaces, so that their own creativity, history, and identity can flourish. Gramsci
sees collective agency as that part of the process whereby the “standards” that
used to be imposed, are then rejected by large portions of the population as being
somehow “correct” and “true” without falling into the liberal individualist notion
that we can all speak our own language. 
BB: In the second chapter of your book, you suggested that both Bakhtin
and Volosinov rejected monologic and as suppressing heteroglossia of
language, to legitimate the idea that Gramsci was for a national unity of
language. However, if we take Todorov’s suggestion of the “heterology”
or “heteroglossia” nature of language, what would then be the difference
between monologic and unity and between multiplicity and unity, since
from whatever angle we approach language, we would end up knocking
on the wall of the punctured nature of language, bared by specific socie-
tal parameters, values, and power?
Put differently, if as you suggested, “unity does not mean homogeneity,
monoglossia, or uniaccentuality” but rather “includes uniqueness and
differences that are not ‘transcended,’ ‘overcome,’ or merged” (p. 93),
how do you see Gramsci’s view of unity in terms of nation and commu-
nity building, especially if we consider the multicultural aspect and mul-
tiple social classes in Italy back then.
PI: There seem to me two issues here, a relatively straight forward one, and a very
difficult one. I’ll start with the first. Todorov’s point here is in agreement with
Gramsci, but contrary to many interpretations of Bakhtin and Volosinov. That is
that language is not by its own nature “heterogloss,” because this would lead to
the problematic contention that monologic language is somehow less linguistic or
true to some ontological status of language, or perhaps some idealised abstraction
of two or more speakers conversing all their differences with no claim of differ-
ent evaluations or attempt at reconciliation. This would yield some version of
Habermas’ “ideal speech situation”—a utopia that even Habermas has to retreat
from when pressed. Todorov argued that “heterology” is the result of social not
linguistic diversity. It is a question of political values not a technical aspect of lan-
guage, which leads us to evaluation heteroglossia.
In the book, I grapple with a similar question with what Gramsci means by stat-
ing that language is not parthenogenetic. Just as with heteroglossia being some
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how part of the nature of language, at first it would seem that Gramsci is saying
that languages cannot grow and change in isolation from other languages by their
own nature. I argue, hopefully sufficiently, that Gramsci does not mean to define
an underlying ontological essence that all language is basedon, since for him,
language is a human institution and its “nature” is not defined outside of human-
ity. Thus, I conclude that he must be making a judgement, like Todorov is about
society, about growth and change within language. Languages change and “gen-
erate” through contact with other languages and social diversity. Put this way, it
sounds as if there is a stark contradiction and paradox with Gramsci’s “search for
unity” (or even “nationalism” although I’m hesitant of that label for him). This
leads us to the much more complex issue.
My first response to this “paradox” is perhaps too easy, but I think there is a cer-
tain weight to it. That is that language provides a great metaphor for politics here,
precisely because the “conformity” required to make a language a language that
many people can understand does not prevent an individual from expressing their
unique perspectives, arguments, feelings, et cetera. But unless individual expres-
sions alter a language itself, we would not say that language has changed just
because people are using it, even using it to express new things, even introducing
a new word like the verb “to google.” I can still talk about “searching for infor-
mation about Gramsci on the internet” even though you might express that by
saying you “googled Gramsci.” But when, for example, English acquires a new
word from a different language like “Inuit” (from Inuktatuk), which replaces
“Eskimo” (apparently derived from Algonquian), Gramsci would consider this
significant language change because it is connected to a more profound change
in the entire conceptualization of an identity and how communities get to label
themselves. Such changes cannot take place without individuals making the argu-
ments, changing their language, et cetera, but individuals alone cannot make the
change, it must become accepted.
Unlike the above “google” example, if you talk about “Eskimos” I will ask
whether you really intend such a derogatory meaning and I will tell you that I
think it is unacceptable. This is obviously a political and moral point that goes
well beyond the question of whether or nort I understand who you are referring
to. (I supppose I should also add that when talking to people from the US or
Britain, depending on the context, I do not always go through the explanation, or
least do so differently than I would with Canadians.)
The more complex aspect to this question focuses on the context in which
Gramsci was searching for a “unity” and the character of that “unity,” which is
not a dogmatic “same-ness” or “homogeneity” but a recognition of the harm done
by the way capitalism in particular and exploitation and oppression more gener-
ally lead to fragmentation and separation of various ideals and values and espe-
cially from our lived experiences and labour (defined very broadly, as Gramsci
does). Thus, in terms of nation and community building, as you asked, Gramsci
is critical of whenever “difference” is used to increase, legitimate, or create con-
ditions of exploitation, or prevent people from creating the solidarities that enable
them to struggle against oppression and exploitation.
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Thus, for him, it was really a “unity” within the world views of rural peasants and
urban workers, which were being pitted against one another, where it was liter-
ally army brigades made up of southern peasants sent in to smash the strikes in
cities like Turin in the north. The type of “common language” or hegemonic force
was clearly required to be “unified” and even national given the role of the state
in creating the army, creating economic policies fostering industrialization in the
north at the expense of trade in the south, and the like. But I think the metaphor
of language works well here in that such a political force is far from “centralized”
and “totalitarian” even if it is pervasive and involved in every aspect of life
including the entertainment one enjoys and how we identify ourselves.
BB: What could we learn more from Gramsci’s politics of language? In
other words what did you learn in analyzing Gramsci’s work, and how
could you apply it to, let’s say, the bilingual system in Canada?
PI: This is obviously a huge question, and one of my current research projects
concerns so-called “global English” where I try to use Gramsci to make some
headway in such debates. The first line of which is equally applicable to bilin-
gualism in Canada, which is to insist that language questions cannot be divorced
from political questions. My own failure to learn French, even though I’ve lived
in Canada now for 16 years, is a political failure as well as an educational one. I
cannot just hide behind the fact that I’ve had a lot of other things to do and also
had to learn Italian in those years. But I also haven’t learned Cree or Hindi.
The second basic point that I think Gramsci drives home very well is that lan-
guage is about so much more than communication and those other dimensions
cannot be separated out from how it functions to allow us to communicate. I
wrote an article last year for a new journal called Studies in Language and
Capitalism where I tried to show how many scholars divorce the function of lan-
guage as a vehicle of communication from its role “symbolically” to identity or
culture. And I try to use Gramsci to show that this is not feasible. This is proba-
bly the most obvious way that the media deals with political language issues.
Getting back to Canada and especially bilingualism, while I applaud the federal
government’s bilingualism in many ways, and am very thankful I can send my
daughter to French immersion, it is important to realize that this is hardly a “solu-
tion” to the French/English language question, especially as many Québécois
make clear, since their aim is not to foster the use of French across ‘English-
speaking’ Canada. Gramsci’s concepts are useful here especially his notion of the
formation of different types of intellectuals.  His attention to class and the eco-
nomics of culture would also lead to the point, familiar to many Canadians and
Québécois, that language can easily become just a gate-keeping function that
reinforces disparities in wealth and resources.
Ironically, though, more and more sociolinguists and people involved in educa-
tion policy are decrying monolingualism of any sort. David Graddol, a prominent
researcher for the British Council, has just issued a dire warning to the UK that
knowing English will not be sufficient as it has been in the past. He urges the UK
to bolster all its language learning education. I think we need to get beyond the
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official bilingualism of the federal government and look to Iqualuit to start think-
ing about how we can try to redeem the atrocious history Canada has with regards
to aboriginal languages. We also need to look at the linguistic realities of our mul-
ticultural urban centres and perhaps look to many in Europe who are being more
explicit about linguistic diversity itself being a value. This may sound like a
repeat of what you called a “paradox” or “contradiction” in my book concerning
“unity” and “diversity,” but Gramsci was never against multilingualism per se.
He pleaded that his niece and nephews be encouraged to speak Sardinian. But he
also realized that political solidarity also has a linguistic component. Thus, if it is
primarily only the elite in Canada who speak English and French, we are in trou-
ble. As is also the case, if it is the elite in the Chinese, Indian, and African com-
munities who are capable of communicating effectively to broad sections of the
Canadian population.
BB: I’d have loved to continue this interesting and enlightening discus-
sion; however, we do have to stop for now. Again, many thanks for your
time and wonderful contribution in helping me and CJC readers better
understand Gramsci’s complexity.
PI: Well, thank you so much for the opportunity and interest.
Notes
1. Ives introduces Bartoli with his starting point, which is “derived from Ascoli’s contention that
where two languages come into contact, there is always conflict between them, just as there is
between the cultures of which they form a part. Thus Bartoli (like Ascoli) finds that linguistics
innovations are not solely parthenogenetic or ‘spontaneous’: rather, they are the result of the rela-
tionships between different languages and different ‘phases’ of the same language” (p. 25).
However, a conflict arises as “Ascoli also maintained that the ‘oral habits’ of a community are not
simply the result of past acquisition and the history of that community; they also have a more per-
manent character, one that is connected to the anatomical structure of the glottis of different
races” (p. 26).
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